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The United States Customs Service's
Regulation of Grey Market Imports: Does
It Preserve the Broad Protections Afforded
by Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930?
I. Introduction
A trademark' serves the interest of the consuming public by al-
lowing consumers to distinguish one company's goods from those of
another. A trademark also protects the private interests of the trade-
mark owner by allowing him to benefit from the public's association
of the mark with a particular standard of quality.' A trademark
identifies the origin of ownership of the goods or services to which it
is affixed. Identification of the original producer or an exclusive dis-
tributor as the source of the goods on which the mark appears enti-
tles the trademark owner to protection against infringement.'
In international trade, trademarked goods create difficulties not
encountered in the domestic marketplace. When trademarked goods
cross national borders, they must continue to identify the source in
the international marketplace. The problem of parallel importation4
and trademark infringement arises when a third party or someone
other than the designated exclusive importer5 imports genuine goods
without the trademark owner's authorization. Given the disparities
between the domestic price of the good and the price paid abroad, an
unauthorized importer will purchase large quantities of the product
abroad from the manufacturer at a thirty to forty percent discount.
I. A trademark is a name, symbol, or other device which identifies a product and which
is legally restricted to the use of the owner or manufacturer of that product. 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1982). See infra note 12.
2. Note, Preventing the Importation and Sale of Genuine Goods: Protecting an Ameri-
can Goodwill, 35 ME. L. REV. 315, 332 (1983) [hereinafter Preventing Importation).
3. The property right that is vested in a trademark is of immense value to the trademark
owner, who is entitled to the protection which the highest powers of the courts can afford.
Krumholtz, The United States Customs Service's Approach to the Gray Market: Does It In-
fringe on the Purposes of Trademark Protection, 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 101,
103 (1986).
4. "Parallel importation" - also referred to as "grey market importation" - occurs
where goods that bear genuine trademarks are manufactured or distributed abroad and then
are imported into the United States without the consent of the registered United States trade-
mark owner. Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Anal-
ysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433, 433 (1981-82).
5. An "exclusive importer" is one who is specially authorized under a contract with the
manufacturer to import marked goods solely for the manufacturer.
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Subsequently, the importer will import the goods, sell them at a dis-
count to retailers and consumers, and eventually drive domestic pro-
ducers who comply with the United States law out of business.
Recent litigation and renewed government regulation have
heightened the debate between trademark owners and parallel im-
porters over the degree of protection to be afforded the American
mark. 6 The legislative and judicial guidelines have been unclear.
Section 526(a) of the Tariff Act7 and section 42 of the Lanham Act'
mandate the exclusion of grey market imports. However, the United
States Customs Service (Customs) has attempted to narrow this pro-
tective legislation. Recent legislation would have codified the Cus-
toms regulations in the interest of promoting price competition and
insulating consumers from overpriced products.' Major opposition to
this proposal arose, however, in favor of protecting the interests of
United States trademark owners' investments.
This Comment will evaluate whether the current import regul-
tion of grey market goods is necessary in light of modern trademark
theory. Section II gives an overview of the functions of a trademark,
discusses registration procedures, and considers the effect of parallel
imports in the international marketplace. Section III examines the
relevant statutory provisions governing the importation of genuine
goods, while Section IV analyzes the recent legislative attempt to
codify Customs regulations and the impact this bill would have on
the rights of the United States trademark owner as opposed to the
consumer's interests. The Comment concludes by evaluating pro-
posed solutions for relief from parallel imports available to the do-
mestic trademark holder.
II. Acquiring and Protecting Trademark Rights
A. Rights of the Trademark Owner
Selective preference of a particular good or service over a com-
peting one is an integral part of free competition. 0 Manufacturers
6. Krumholtz, supra note 3, at 108 n.100.
7. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. 77-361, § 526, 46 Stat. 741, amended by 19 U.S.C. §
1526 (1982).
8. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-489, § 42, 60 Stat. 440, amended by 15
U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
9. S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. 89 (1986). The Price Competitive
Products Act, as the bill was known, would have codified Customs regulations that deny pro-
tection to trademark owners under common ownership. The bill would have recognized inde-
pendent United States trademark owners having an established reputation and international
goodwill, but would have narrowed the broad scope of protection offered by the Tariff Act and
The Lanham Act. Id.
10. "Competition" is defined as the act or proceeding of striving for something that is
sought by another at the same time; a contention of two or more for the same object or for
superiority; rivalry, as between aspirants for honors or for advantage in business. NEW STAN-
DARD DICTIONARY 542 (16th ed. 1946).
[Vol. 5:2
REGULATION OF GREY MARKET IMPORTS
must compete to win the consumer's confidence and satisfaction in
their product. The quality and presentation of an item placed on the
market represents the company's good name. The consumer comes to
rely on the manufacturer's reputation as a guarantee of superior
quality.1 In order to safeguard the manufacturer's marketability of
his goods or services, he must establish a trademark" by which the
consumer and competitors can identify his ownership of the particu-
lar product.
Through this marketing process, the consumer identifies the
trademark with the company's product: A trademark serves the pub-
lic's interest by providing a means of distinguishing one company's
goods from those of another. Simultaneously, a trademark insures
the trademark owner's private interests by guaranteeing the owner
the benefit of the public's association of the mark with a particular
standard of quality.13
The "primary and proper function" of a trademark is to identify
the origin of ownership of the article to which the mark is affixed. 4
A trademark must distinguish goods from those products of competi-
tors producing a mark. A trademark guarantees consistent quality
and, consequently, helps to successfully market commodities.1 As an
indicator of the source and quality of goods, a trademark has tradi-
tionally been protected where the trademark owner owns the good-
will.' The courts examine both the public's association of a specific
trademark to a product and which business maintains control over
the trademarked goods.'1
Protection of a manufacturer's trademark rights may vary in
effectiveness, depending on whether the domestic and foreign entities
producing the same named product are related or whether they are
11. Through advertising, quality assurance, and promotional warranties, the manufac-
turer develops a reputation that the consumer comes to recognize and rely on. This is charac-
terized as "goodwill." Note, The Greying of American Trademarks - The Genuine Goods
Exclusion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulations, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21, 54 FORD. L.
REv. 83, 84 n.5 (1985) [hereinafter Greying American Trademarks]. Goodwill is the favorable
consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular
source. Id. at 84. It is both a purchasing tool for the consuming public and a business asset for
the trademark owner. Goodwill is the benefit acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere
value of capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general
public patronage and encouragement received from constant or habitual customers. See
Preventing Importation, supra note 2, at 320 n.35.
12. The Trademark Act provides that "the term 'trademark' includes any word, name,
symbol or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant
to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." Lan-
ham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 45, 60 Stat. 427, amended by 15 U.S.C. §
1127.
13. Preventing Importation. supra note 2, at 332.
14. Id. at 315.
15. Id. at 312.
16. Greying American Trademarks, supra note I1, at 84.
17. Preventing Importation, supra note 2, at 333.
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operating as independent companies. When a close relationship 8 be-
tween the domestic and foreign mark holder exists, the importation
of genuine goods19 does not infringe on the United States registrant's
trademark rights,20 thereby necessitating less trademark infringe-
ment protection, 21 whereas an independent United States registrant
is able to vary the product quality which demands protection from
the importation of inferior goods bearing the same trademark. 2 The
consumer relies on the trademark as a guarantee of a particular
standard of quality. The grey market items most likely to deceive or
confuse consumers as to the source of the merchandise will be pro-
hibited from sale. *2
Trademarks enable the purchaser to distinguish between the
goods of competing producers and to choose between these goods
based upon the differences in manufacturer quality. 24 Consumer
awareness consequently forces competing producers to produce supe-
rior products in order to retain their marketability in a highly com-
petitive economy.? Trademark protection of these superior products
is necessary for producers to maintain consumer confidence and re-
tain their profits and position in the marketplace.
B. Acquiring Ownership of a Trademark
In the United States, trademark rights are acquired solely
through use of the mark on goods in the marketplace. Priority is
afforded to the first user of the mark on the product2 6 To establish
ownership rights, arrangements for an early sale of the trademarked
product should be made. The trademark must first be used in com-
18. Under Customs regulations a "close relationship" is categorized as either a parent/
subsidiary or foreign and domestic companies with common ownership. Importations Bearing
Recorded Trademarks or Trade Names, 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985) [hereinafter Importations].
19. A product that bears a "genuine" trademark, also referred to as a "genuine good,"
is one that is not an unauthorized simulation or counterfeit, but rather is an original product.
Krumholtz, supra note 3, at 101.
20. Note, Trade-mark Infringement: The Power of an American Trade-mark Owner to
Prevent the Importation of the Authentic Product Manufactured by a Foreign Company, 64
YALE L.J. 557, 567 (1955) [hereinafter Trade-mark Infringement].
21. Contra Krumholtz, supra note 3, at 11. However, by denying protection to trade-
mark owners who are related to their foreign counterparts or who have consented to the use of
their mark in the foreign marketplace, the regulations fail to recognize that a separate and
independent goodwill may have been established by the domestic mark owner, regardless of its
affiliation with the foreign registrant. Id.
22. Supnik, The Bell & Howell:Mamiya Case - Where Now Parallel Imports?, 74
TRADE-MARK REP. I, 16 (1984).
23. See, e.g., Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (enjoining
use of Yale trademark by maker of flashlight and batteries not holding trademark).
24. Trade-mark Infringement, supra note 20, at 565.
25. Id.
26. I J.T. MCCARTHY. TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 571-72 (1973). To ac-
quire trademark ownership, one must actually use the mark in the sale of goods and services.
No rights accrue to one who merely selects a trademark without use of it in the advertising or
sale of goods. Id. at 572.
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merce in the United States." Despite the absence of a registration
requirement prior to the product's sale, it is advisable to register the
marks with the Patent and Trademark Office to guarantee sale own-
ership rights and discourage infringement.28
In registering the trademark, the applicant must first establish
convincing evidence of actual lawful use of the trademark in con-
junction with the goods or services. 2" Registration in the Patent and
Trademark Office offers numerous benefits. It gives notice to other
competitors of trademark use, creates a presumption of ownership,
offers exclusive use rights, and may be used as the basis for ob-
taining registration in foreign countries.30 United States registration
serves as a declaration of one's ownership rights.
Trademarks may be rejected by the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice for various reasons. Marks may be rejected as being contrary to
public policy,8 1 an invasion of another's right of privacy,32 or likely
to cause confusion with other marks or trade names.33 Descriptive
words, deceptively misdescribed words, geographical names, and sur-
names also are prohibited marks.34 Applications for registration of a
27. The Lanham Act requires that an application for trademark registration include "a
statement to the effect . . . that the mark is in use in commerce." Lanham Trademark Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 45, 60 Stat. 427, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). "Com-
merce" can mean either interstate or foreign commerce. I J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at
720.
28. 1 J.T. MCCARTHY. supra note 26, at 574. A trademark registration on the federal
Principal Register is at least prima facie evidence of the registrant's ownership and exclusive
right to use of the mark. Id. For a discussion of the Principal Register, see infra note 35.
29. Id. Registration on the federal Principal Register is also prima facie evidence of a
continual use of the mark, dating back to the filing date of the application. Id. If a registrant
later claims that usage of the mark began prior to the filing date, such usgae must be sup-
ported by "clear and convincing evidence" (i.e. not characterized by contradictions, vagueness,
or inconsistencies). Id. at 800.
30. Id. at 600-01.
31. Registration of a mark is absolutely prohibited if it consists of or comprises: a) im-
moral matter, b) deceptive matter, c) scandalous matter, d) matter which may disparage or
bring into contempt or disrepute or falsely suggest a connection with persons (living or dead),
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or e) the flag, or coat of arms or other insignia of the
United States, any state, any municipality or any foreign nation or any simulation thereof. See
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 2(a), 60 Stat. 427, amended by 15
U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
32. The right of privacy is the fundamental right to be left alone. This is the basis of the
statute's inclusion of a prohibition against registration of a mark which consists of or com-
prises a name, a portrait, or a signature identifying a particular "living" individual except by
his or her written consent. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 2(b), 60
Stat. 427, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
33. The statute prohibits registration if a mark consists of or comprises matter or fea-
tures which so resemble a mark previously used in the United States by another trademark
owner (and not abandoned) as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchas-
ers. In determining whether there are confusing similarities between two marks, the courts
must consider a) whether the newly adopted mark looks like, sounds like, or conveys a mean-
ing similar to a mark already registered or used in the United States, and b) whether the
products of the parties are so alike that a consumer might expect that they come from the
same business. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 2(d), 60 Stat. 427,
amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
34. The common descriptive name of the product (also known as the generic term) can
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trademark can be made on the Principal 35 and Supplemental" Reg-
isters. Registration rights on both the Principal and Supplemental
Registers are granted for twenty years, subject to a sworn declara-
tion by the trademark owner that the trademark is still in use after
its sixth year.37 Registration may be renewed indefinitely for an ad-
ditional twenty year period, provided that the mark is still in use at
the time of renewal.88
The trademark registration procedure in United States differs
from the establishment of trademark rights in foreign countries. In
many countries, trademark rights arise at common law through use,
but enforceable rights in court are derived from registration of the
trademark prior to its use. An individual or company located outside
the United States may obtain a registration, provided the mark is
being used within the commerce of the respective country. 39 The
mark sought to be registered must meet the standard rule of regis-
trability of the particular country. Furthermore, the individual or
corporation seeking the registration must be a resident of that coun-
try.40 A foreign producer must file an application in most foreign
countries prior to actual use to register a trademark. The registration
procedures in foreign nations afford initial protection to the regis-
never function as a trademark and, thus, cannot be registered. A term that misdescribes the
product in connection with which it is used may be registrable upon proof of a secondary
meaning. Geographical names may be used without restriction at least by all whose business is
located within that particular locality. A geographical name that primarily indicates a place of
production may not be registered by any one person. Names which are primarily surnames
may not be registered because others having the same surname are entitled to use it. As with
descriptive terms and geographical names, however, surnames may be used exclusively by one
person so long as it is to acquire a secondary meaning in connection with a specific product.
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 2(e), 60 Stat. 427, amended by 15
U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
35. E.C. VANDENBURGH III, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE 310 (1942). The Prin-
cipal Register provides constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership of the mark
shown in registration. When a mark is registered on the Principal Register, no one may com-
mence using an identical or confusingly similar mark and assert lack of awareness of the
mark's unavailability. Registration on the Principal Register also provides evidence of the va-
lidity of registration, the registrant's ownership, and his exclusive right to use the mark. This
registration may be used as the basis of obtaining registration in any foreign country which by
treaty or law affords reciprocal privileges. Id. at 312.
36. The Supplemental Register is comprised of words, phrases, surnames, geographical
names, slogans, labels, numerals and those that did not meet the Act's requirements for regis-
tration on the Principal Register. Although registration on the Supplemental Register does not
provide constructive notice of a claim of ownership, it may still be used as a basis for obtaining
registration in foreign countries. Id. at 313.
37. 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at 743-44. See also Lanham Trademark Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 9, 60 Stat. 427, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
38. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 9, 60 Stat. 427, amended
by 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
39. See supra note 27.
40. "If the applicant is not domiciled in the United States he shall designate by a writ-
ten document filed in the Patent and Trademark Office the name and address of some person
resident in the (country) on whom may be served notices or process in proceedings affecting
the mark . . ." Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § l(d), 60 Stat. 427,
amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
REGULATION OF GREY MARKET IMPORTS
trant by preventing others from simultaneously using a similar mark.
This sharply contrasts with United States procedures, which afford
no protection until use is established.
C. Grey Market Importation
Regardless of a country's registration procedures, the problem
of parallel, or "grey market," importation exists to varying degrees
in many countries. Grey market importation occurs where identical
or similar trademarked products are distributed through exclusive
national distributors in different countries, and where one or more of
those countries do not enforce the domestic distributors' exclusive
trademark rights against products coming in from other countries.
"Grey market importers" are unauthorized distributors who
purchase trademarked products from distributors, wholesalers, or re-
tailers in one country and ship these products to wholesalers or re-
tailers in another country. These unauthorized, imported goods bear
the trademark owner's name and reputation but they are not distrib-
uted through licensed channels. The grey market importer sells the
product for a tremendous profit, of which the trademark owner and
the authorized distributor see none. Thus, the authentic trademark
owner is deprived of the goodwill established through the public's
association with the trademark.
Manufacturers distribute trademarked goods through one or
two national distributors, rather than through numerous competing
distributors, in each country. This gives distributors adequate incen-
tive to promote their brands in competition with other manufactur-
ers' products."' Exclusive distribution of a trademarked item guaran-
tees to each distributor the profits from marketing investments.
Where the distributor is an exclusive licensee and not the trademark
owner, the foreign and domestic operations are characterized as a
single entity under "common ownership." "' Customs does not pro-
tect an entity under common ownership from any unauthorized im-
portation of the entity's own genuine goods. Grey market goods are
to be excluded, however, when: (1) an American distributor owns the
41. See Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 6 (1981); R. BACK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 280-98
(1978).
42. Importations, supra note 18, at § 133.21(c). "Common ownership and control" are
defined in the Customs regulations as follows:
(a) "Common ownership" means individual or aggregate ownership of more
than fifty percent of the business entity; and (b) "Common control" means effec-
tive control in policy and operations and is not necessarily synonymous with
common ownership. One justification for Customs' approach is that when a close
relationship between the domestic and foreign markholders exists, the importa-
tion of genuine goods does not infringe upon the U.S. registrant's trademark
rights.
Trade-mark Infringement, supra note 20, at 567.
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trademark right in the distributor's own name, (2) an independent
goodwill has been established, or (3) the American entity is indepen-
dent from the foreign trademark owner.4 s The problem of parallel
importation is handled differently in some foreign countries.
In Japan, the owner of either a trademark or an exclusive use
right may demand that the Customs Bureau there exclude imported
goods which infringe the owner's trademark right."" The Customs
Duties Act of Japan 45 prohibits the importation of goods that would
infringe a domestic patent, utility model, industrial design, trade-
mark, or copyright.' 6 Neither Japan's Trademark Law 41 nor its
Customs Duties Act, however, expressly prohibits parallel importa-
tion of genuine goods. As in the United States, Japanese law permits
parallel importation by third parties if the domestic trademark
owner also holds the foreign trademark and supplies goods to the
parallel importer or if the domestic and foreign trademark owners
are considered to be the same entity.48
In the European Economic Community (EEC), member nations
are signatories to a charter document known as the Treaty of
Rome.'9 This document generally prohibits any agreements between
enterprises that are likely to restrict competition within the EEC's
Common Market.6 0 The unification of trademark law within the
Common Market started in the 1960s. 1 Although trademark law
never has developed into effective law in the Common Market, the
EEC's Commission has worked for trademark law regulations to pro-
mote competition and free movement within European countries.52
The Commission has created provisions providing that a trademark
owner may not prohibit the use of the trademark for goods put into
the market by himself or with his consent. 83 Most of the Commis-
sion's proposals generally recognize the lawfulness of parallel
43. Importations, supra note 18, at § 133.21(c).
44. Takamatsu, supra note 4, at 440.
45. Kanzei Teiritsu ho, Law No. 54 of 1901.
46. Takamatsu, supra-note 4, at 440.
47. Shohyo ho, Law No. 127 of 1959.
48. Takamatsui, supra note 4, at 440.
49. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. The EEC, also known as the Euro-
pean Common Market, is an economic union comprising Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, and West Germany. It is organized in a federal system similar to that of the
United States. The four main institutions in the EEC are: (1) the Commission (executive
branch); (2) the Council of Ministers; (3) the European Parliament; and (4) the Court of
Justice. The nine members of the Commission are unanimously appointed by the governments
of the six nations and cannot accept instructions from governments or any national interests.
The Commission makes administrative proposals to the Council, which then takes a majority
vote on each proposal. The Commission and Council have headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. 6
WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 322 (1967).
50. See Takamatsu, supra note 4, at 447.
51. Id. at 451 n.105.
52. Id. at 451.
53. Id.
[Vol. 5:2
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importation. 5'
The parallel importation industry is a narrowly regulated indus-
try in both Japan and the EEC, whereas, in the United States, it is a
major concern to trademark owners. To some extent, the legality of
parallel importation depends on the facts. Generally, the exercise of
one's domestic trademark rights in an attempt to block parallel im-
portation will be denied if the rights are held by one person or if the
domestic and foreign trademark owners are related. 5 On the other
hand, a domestic trademark owner will be more likely to succeed in
a block of parallel importation if the domestic and foreign trademark
owners are unrelated and both trademarks have been acquired inde-
pendently.56 Furthermore, whereas a foreign registrant receives only
protection against the counterfeits of his mark, an independent do-
mestic firm is afforded more extensive protection against the genuine
mark under the Lanham Act.57 A United States trademark assignee
can sue a foreign assignor for either a breach of contract or unfair
competition. It appears, however, that a United States registrant is
powerless to stop a third party not subject to any contractual agree-
ment from importing the genuine product.5 8 Nevertheless, legislative
treatment of parallel importation does provide a skeletal form of re-
lief for the United States registrant.59
54. Id. at 452.
55. Id. at 453. See e.g., United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1957), va-
cated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y: 1959). For
a discussion of the Guerlain case, see infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
56. Takamatsu, supra note 4, at 453. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, 589 F.2d
1163, 1171 (2d Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the Osawa case, see infra notes 109-13 and
accompanying text. See also Derenberg, Territorial Scope & Situs of Trademarks and Good-
will, 47 VA. L. REV. 733 (1961).
57. Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise - The Role of the
U.S. Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 303 (1969).
58. It is often difficult for a trademark owner to police illegal importation of his products
into the United States. Some courts have indicated that even an American distributor, al-
though not the owner of the trademark in the United States, may also be protected from
parallel importation on the basis of prohibitions against unfair competition or unlawful inter-
ference with contractual relations. Parallel importation itself, however, does not constitute un-
fair competition unless such importation of genuine goods confuses or deceives the public.
Takamatsu, supra note 4, at 438.
59. The Tariff Act of 1930, the primary statute which addresses the problem of parallel
imports, provides:
It shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture which bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or a corpo-
ration or association created or organized within, the United States, and regis-
tered in a specific manner unless written consent of the owner of such trademark
is produced at the time of making entry.
Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 77-361, § 526(a), 46 Stat. 741, amended by 19 U.S.C. §
1526(a) (1982). The Lanham Act further provides that "[no article of imported merchandise
which shall copy or simulate . . . a trademark registered in accordance with the law . . . shall
be admitted to entry at any custom house of the United States. Lanham Trademark Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 42, 60 Stat. 440, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982). Together,
the Tariff Act and the Lanham Act address trademarked imported merchandise at two levels.
Section 526 of the Tariff Act simply looks to whether such goods bear a registered or recorded
trademark owned by a United States registrant without regard to any claim of trademark
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
D. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Parallel Importation
The fundamental issue surrounding parallel imports is whether
a United States trademark owner and manufacturer can exclude im-
ported goods which bear its trademark but are imported by unautho-
rized sources. American companies argue that the confusion and de-
ception caused by the unauthorized importation of these genuine
goods seriously injures business in ways which demonstrate trade-
mark infringement. Trademark owners claim that grey market goods
take a "free ride" on the American trademark owner's advertising
and warranty operations. The infringer further benefits from the re-
sulting reputation and goodwill associated with the trademark in the
United States.10
On the other hand, grey market importers emphasize their abil-
ity to offer to the consumer the same item at a decreased cost."1 This
promotes price competition, while the exclusion of grey market goods
represents the enforcement of anticompetitive policies by the Ameri-
can private sector. This situation creates an American monopoly
within particular industries.
True price discrimination is possible only when three market
conditions are present. First, a seller-manufacturer must enjoy a mo-
nopoly, or a substantial degree, of market power. Price discrimina-
tion implies that the trademark owner charges a price greater than
the market costs. Second, there must be two or more distinct groups
of consumers, foreign and domestic, whose demands for the product
differ in relation to price. Third, trade between purchasers of the
higher-priced and lower-priced goods must be restricted in some
way.62 Otherwise, trade between two consumer groups will erode the
higher price in the same manner as competition from sellers of rival
products.0 3
infringement, whereas section 42 of the Lanham Act is the basic trademark infringement stat-
ute applied to imports. See Victor, Preventing Importation of Products in Violation of Prop-
erty Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 783 (1984). See also Atwood, supra note 57, at 301.
60. United States trademark owners complain that sales outside the authorized distribu-
tion chain result in lost prestige, which impairs the trademark's goodwill and diffuses their
promotional efforts. Victor, supra note 59, at 790. See also Coalition to Preserve the Integrity
of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (assert-
ing that grey market goods often are of a different quality). Courts have tended to ground
relief on both deception of the public about the source of trademarked goods and infringement
of private property rights. Infringement is found if the grey market goods are likely to cause
confusion, mistake, or deception. Preventing Importation, supra note 2, at 316.
61. Victor, supra note 59, at 791.
62. G. STIGLER. THE THEORY OF PRICE, 209-14 (3d ed. 1966).
63. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, Comments to the
United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury 9 (October 20, 1986) (available
from the law firm of Covington and Burling, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter COPIAT Com-
ments]. The Comments were in response to a proposed Treasury Department regulation on the
grey market issue. See Importations Bearing Recorded U.S. Trademarks; Solicitation of Public
Comment on Gray Market Policy Options, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (proposed June 17, 1986).
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A second argument maintained by trademark owners is the
"free riding" 4 by grey market importers off the domestic marketing
investments of national distributors and their wholesalers and retail-
ers. The total costs of brand named products processed through ex-
clusive distributors tend to be the marketing costs incurred by in-
termediaries between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer.15
The purpose of exclusive distribution is to give distributors incentives
to make adequate marketing investments. Increased consumer de-
mand will result where national distributors make large investments
in marketing trademarked products. Unfortunately, this will create
more opportunities for grey market importers as well. 66
An unauthorized distributor of a trademarked product typically
makes two types of investments in promoting it. One type of invest-
ment consists of brand advertising. 67 Brand advertising informs re-
tailers of the brand's features through trade publications. These in-
vestments do not directly affect the quality of the product, but they
do provide consumer information. A second type of trademarked
product investment is quality promotion, whereby expenditures are
made to improve the product's market reputation by enhancing its
quality.66 Through careful inspection, handling, inventory control,
careful selection of retailers and a provision of warranty, the manu-
facturer-trademark owner exercises a degree of quality control upon
which the consumer relies.69
Grey market importers benefit from both types of marketing in-
vestments because their products bear the same trademarks as the
products of authorized distributors, thereby profiting from the
brand's current market reputation by thriving on the public's associ-
ation with the product. 70 They have neither the facilities nor the
64. "Free riding" occurs when
* * * a United States trademark owner, having established an independent
goodwill for its mark, is injured by the grey market importer. If the grey mar-
keter imports goods of an inferior quality or of a style that fails to meet the
consumer's demand, it will cause confusion and, inevitably, injury to the national
goodwill for the product.
Krumholtz, supra note 3, at 107. See also supra note I I and accompanying text. This "free
rider" phenomenon deprives the United States trademark owner of goodwill benefits to which
it is legally entitled. Krumholtz, supra note 3, at 107.
65. COPIAT Comments, supra note 63, at 10. Marketing costs include expenditures on
brand advertising and promotion, quality control, product inspection, handling, inventory man-
agement, retail displays and retailer training, and warranty and service programs. Id.
66. An increased consumer demand for a trademarked product, due to substantial ex-
penditures in marketing, will result in a larger degree of grey market imports. The incentive of
high profits and the low overhead in importation gives grey market importers a free ride on the
distributors' marketing investments. Id.
67. See E.C. VANDENBURCH Ill, supra note 35, at 310. See also COPIAT Comments,
supra note 63, at 17.
68. COPIAT Comments, supra note 63, at 17.
69. Id. at 18.
70. Id.
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incentive to uphold the "goodwill" of a trademark owner. Conse-
quently, the exercise of quality control is not important to grey mar-
ket importers. Therefore, their unauthorized importation of trade-
marked, inferior goods deceives the public into assuming that the
purchased product derives from the trademarked source, which rep-
resents past assurances of reliability and good quality.
The sale of inferior quality grey market imports is harmful to
the United States economic welfare. Discount retailers, grey market
importers, and, often, consumers argue that these imports prevent
monopolization of the industry and encourage price competition.
Grey market importers maintain less incentive, however, to invest
the time and effort into market advertising and quality control. Con-
sumers are harmed when they purchase products whose quality is
less than they reasonably anticipated and for what they paid. The
United States authorized distributor is also harmed by lost sales due
to an injured market reputation caused by the flood of inferior prod-
ucts incorrectly associated with the legitimately trademarked prod-
ucts. This can lead the authorized distributors to reduce their future
expenditures on promoting and improving the product, to the further
detriment of the consumers. 71
III. Legal History of Parallel Imports in the United States
The present legal status of grey market goods is unclear. The
statutes protecting the trademark owner's rights appear to offer
broad protection against grey market imports and trademark in-
fringement. However, Customs regulations which implement those
statutes include exceptions which expressly deny such protection to
the trademark owner.7 2 Section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930
states that if a registered United States trademark that is owned by
an American citizen, corporation, or association is recorded with
Customs, the importation of foreign produced goods bearing that
trademark is unlawful without the United States trademark owner's
written consent. 73 Similarly, section 42 of the Lanham Act of 1946
provides that "no article of imported merchandise ...which shall
copy or simulate a registered trademark shall be admitted to entry at
any custom house of the United States. '74 Despite the statutes' clear
intent to protect the trademark owner, the Customs regulations deny
protection to American companies under common ownership or con-
71. Id. at 19.
72. Victor, supra note 59, at 791.
73. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 77-361, § 526(a), 46 Stat. 741, amended by 19
U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
74. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 42, 60 Stat. 440, amended
by 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
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trol with the foreign manufacturer of trademarked goods.76 Protec-
tion is also denied if the goods are trademarked abroad with the con-
sent of the owner. In response, United States trademark owners have
challenged the Customs regulations by urging implementation of the
plain meaning of section 526. On the other hand, the Customs Ser-
vice argues that the regulations prevent price discrimination against
American consumers. The legislative history of section 526 supports
Customs' position. Courts confronted with the grey market problem,
however, oscillate between these two points.
Prior to the enactment of section 526, goods that bore a genuine
trademark - genuine goods - were not excluded by Customs be-
cause importation and sale of such goods did not constitute trade-
mark infringement under section 27 of the Trade-Mark Act of
1905.76 Congress enacted section 526 to prohibit the unauthorized
importation of goods bearing a registered mark. Section 42 of the
Lanham Act operates in conjunction with section 526 to limit trade-
mark infringement of imported goods.
Congress' enactment of section 526 was prompted by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals decision in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Kat-
zel. 7 In this case, the plaintiff had purchased the American business
and trademark rights to "Java," a French face powder, from the
French manufacturer.7 8 The defendant then purchased some Java in
France, transported it to the United States, and re-sold it under the
"Java" trademark.79 The federal trial court issued a preliminary in-
junction barring the defendant's actions. so On appeal, the Second
Circuit reversed the issuance of the injunction, reasoning that impor-
tation of genuine goods could not constitute infringement of a United
States trademark. 81
In an opinion delivered by Justice Holmes, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and ordered the rein-
statement of the district court's injunction in favor of the plaintiff,
Bourjois.82 Justice Holmes noted that three reasons supported a con-
clusion that the plaintiff had proven trademark ownership. First,
75. See Importations, supra note 18, at § 133.21(c).
76. See Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 42, 33 Stat. 724 (1905) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982)). This section provided in part: "No article of imported
merchandise shall copy or simulate . . . a trademark registered in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Act [and] shall be admitted to entry at any custom-house of the United States
I .. id. at 730. Before the enactment of section 526, courts denied use of a United States
trademark to exclude imports if the importer legitimately acquired the genuine goods abroad.
Takamatsu, supra note 4, at 434.
77. 274 F. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), rev'd, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689
(1923).
78. Katzel, 274 F. at 857.
79. Id. at 858.
80. Id. at 860.
81. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921).
82. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690 (1923).
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Bourjois had purchased the French film's trademarks and had devel-
oped a goodwill, thus making his company the new source of the face
powder.83 Second, consumers perceived that the goods originated
from Bourjois.84 Finally, Bourjois had staked his company's reputa-
tion on the quality of the face powder, leading consumers to rely on
the "Java" trademark as an assurance of quality.85 Employing a
"territoriality" concept of trademark rights,8 the Court determined
that the use of a mark which correctly identifies the origin of the
goods may infringe nonetheless upon the American owner's trade-
mark rights.87
Even before the Supreme Court's reversal of the 1921 Court of
Appeals decision in Katzel, Congress took action to clarify its posi-
tion by passing the Tariff Act of 1922, 88 which contained the con-
troversial section 526. The support for this section was premised on
the belief that those who purchase both the American trademark
and the goodwill of foreign manufacturers deserve protection. With-
out such protection, it was throught that a foreign manufacturer
would be unable to compete in the United States market. 89 The
statutory language expanded the facts of Katzel by prohibiting all
imports of foreign-made goods bearing trademarks owned by Ameri-
can citizens, corporations, and associations without regard to (a) the
relationship or past dealings between the United States trademark
owner, the foreign manufacturer, and a possible parallel importer, or
(b) actual infringement of the trademark. The legislative history of
section 526, however, "plainly indicates an intent only to protect the
property rights of American citizens who have purchased trademarks
from foreigners[,]" as in Katzel.90
The controversy surrounding section 526 has oscillated between
two positions: the plain and broad application excluding all grey
market goods and the narrow application to factual situations similar
to Katzel. The Government seriously began attempting to limit the
trademark protection afforded under section 526 during the 1950s.
In 1953, Customs adopted a regulation which denies United States
83. Id. at 692.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. "Territoriality" recognizes the separate legal existence of a trademark under each
country's laws, symbolizing the domestic goodwill of the domestic trademark owner. The terri-
toriality of trademark rights is grounded in the "sovereignty of nations" doctrine as well as in
the view that trademark rights arise out of use of the mark in a particular geographic market.
Greying American Trademarks, supra note 11, at 106-108. See also Victor, supra note 59, at
793. See generally E.C. VANDENBURGH IIl, supra note 35.
87. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 690.
88. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
(1982).
89. Greying American Trademarks, supra note 11, at 83.
90. Preventing Importation, supra note 2, at 323-24.
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trademark owners the right to prevent trademarked importations if
the United States and foreign trademarks are owned by related
companies."'
In conjunction with the Customs Bureau's administrative at-
tempt to narrow the broad protections of section 526, the Depart-
ment of Justice, in United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 92 brought actions
against three American cosmetic companies that relied upon section
526 to exclude unauthorized importations of toiletries manufactured
and sold by their associated foreign companies.9 3 The Department of
Justice found the cosmetic companies' procedure to be anticompeti-
tive since all channels of trade were controlled by an international
enterprise. In the district court, the Department of Justice success-
fully proved that the defendants' actions violated the Sherman Act 4
by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the goods sold under
the trademark.95 The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court,
where the judgment was vacated at the request of the Justice De-
partment. 6 This unusual request was based in part on a desire to
propose legislation to remedy a perceived misuse of section 526 by
international enterprises to monopolize the United States market.97
However, the Solicitor General conceded that Customs' practice was
originally designed to permit the exclusion of goods bearing trade-
marks affixed by companies related to United States trademark own-
ers. He proposed that the conflict between the protection of trade-
marks provided for under section 526 and the antitrust
91. Importations, supra note 18, at § 133.21(c).
92. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958),
dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. -1959).
93. The defendants were Guerlain, Inc., Parfums Corday, Inc., and Lanvin Parfums,
Inc. They marketed trademarked toiletry goods which were known for their quality and rela-
tively high price. Each of the American companies was closely associated with a French com-
pany that originated the products' trade names. The goods that were sold in the United States
by the defendants were obtained from the French companies in packaged form ready for sale,
or in bulk and bottled in the United States, or compounded in the United States. These prod-
ucts then would be sold in the United States under trademarks identical with those used by the
French companies, thereby advertising the prestige factor of origin with Parisian perfumers.
Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 79.
94. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 1987). This section currently provides
that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony[.]" Id.
95. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 87-88. The district court emphasized that the trademarks
registered by the defendants in the United States indicated that the goods came from France
rather than from the defendants - the true source. Consequently, the court concluded that
parallel importation would not deceive the public about either the authenticity or origin of the
goods. Id. at 81-82.
96. Guerlain, 358 U.S. at 915. (1958).
97. The Justice Department's motion to vacate was also based on a conflict with the
Customs Service regarding the application of section 526. The Customs Service took the posi-
tion that related defendants should be protected by the statute. The Justice Department con-
ceded that Customs' position was supported by a literal reading of the statute. See id.
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considerations of Guerlain was best resolved by Congress."
As a result of the Guerlain case, Customs expressly went to the
more limited exception of allowing importation without consent only
if the "same entity"" owned the trademark right here and abroad.
In 1972, Customs regulations were revised in order to limit the per-
ceived anticompetitive effects of section 526. The current regulations
not only contain the "same entity" limitation but also exclude from
statutory protection all United States trademark owners who have
either foreign common ownership, parent/subsidiary relationships
with foreign companies, 100 or licensed foreign manufacturers. 101
Over the years, Customs' inconsistent interpretation of section 526
has carried varying degrees of authority in the courts.102 Customs
allowed the importation of genuine goods from 1923 to 1936 and
from 1959 to 1972, regardless of any relationship between the
United States trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer, but
prohibited importation during the years 1936 to 1959 and from 1972
to the present. 103
By the early 1980s, the grey market continued to grow due to
the increased value of the American dollar and the decrease in prices
abroad. United States trademark owners began to feel the effects of
an increased rate of unauthorized importations of genuine goods and
sought to prevent further expansion. Varied forms of prevention have
led to inconsistent applications of section 526 of the Tariff Act and
section 42 of the Lanham Act.
In Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 104 the
Eastern District Court of New York preliminarily enjoined the im-
portation and sale of unauthorized Mamiya trademarked cameras.
The court ruled that United States trademarks operate under the
"territoriality" concept. 105 The public associated Mamiya cameras
with the American distributor rather than with the Japanese manu-
98. Victor, supra note 59, at 795.
99. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Atwood, supra note 57, at 307.
100. Importations, supra note 18, at § 133.21(c)(2). An application to record a trade
name must include "the identity of any parent or subsidiary company, or other foreign com-
pany under common ownership or control which uses the trade name abroad." Id.
101. Customs will not exclude imported articles when "the articles of foreign manufac-
ture bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner."
Id. at § 133.21(c)(3).
102. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd,
761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986) (Customs' regulations are
given little deference). But see Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Customs Service is entitled to "substantial deference").
103. Greying American Trademarks, supra note II, at 101.
104. 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). An
American company, engaged on an exclusive basis in the business of importing and selling
trademarked goods of foreign manufacturers under United States trademark rights it had ac-
quired, sought to enjoin the unauthorized competitive sale in the United States of the same,
identically trademarked goods. 548 F. Supp. at 1063.
105. Id. at 1073. See also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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facturer. The district court held that those grey market products
could cause confusion and damaged the reputation and goodwill de-
veloped by the American distributor. 0 6 The judge did not apply the
Customs regulations allowing grey market imports under section 526
because the American distributor was not a related party to the pro-
ducer of the grey market cameras. 107 The injunction was vacated by
the Second Circuit for two reasons. First, the district court judge
had found a likelihood of irreparable injury merely from the likeli-
hood of consumer confusion between authorized and grey market
goods. Second, the United States trademark owner had failed to pre-
sent sufficient evidence that it would suffer actual economic injury if
the grey market imports continued. 101
The plaintiff in Mamiya, under the new name "Osawa & Co.,"
then filed for an injunction in the Southern District Court of New
York against the discount camera dealers who were violating the
Customs regulations by importing Mamiya cameras without Osawa's
authorization. 109 The Court granted the plaintiff a preliminary in-
junction, 11o concluding that the Customs Service may have exceeded
its authority in promulgating regulations pertaining to the importa-
tion of trademarked goods."' Referring specifically to the provisions
denying exclusion orders where the domestic and foreign trademark
owners are under common control or ownership, the court stated that
section 526(a) "contains no suggestion that the right of the U.S.
markholder to receive the statute's benefits depends on the subtle
variations in its relationship with the foreign markholder." 11 The
court added that, while Customs' regulations appeared to represent
an effort to implement its perception of antitrust policy, nothing in
section 526(a) suggests that Congress conferred authority on the
Customs Service to condition the statutory benefits on Customs' own
analysis of antitrust policy. 113
Customs' narrow interpretation of section 526 was rejected in
both the Mamiya and the Osawa cases. By limiting protection under
106. Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1079.
107. See Importations, supra note 18, at § 133.21(c).
108. 719 F.2d 42, 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
109. Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
110. Osawa satisfied the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction by proving that cus-
tomer confusion, damage to reputation, and a deteriorating effect on business had caused ir-
reparable harm, thus tipping the balance of hardships in its favor. Id. at 1165, 1168, 1170.
11l. The court felt that this question need not be decided in view of Customs' grant of
an exclusion order to Osawa. Id. at 1177.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1177. The court questioned the wisdom of the regulations by stating that
antitrust questions are far too complex to be reasonably decided on the basis of the short
Customs questionnaire on corporate ownership. Id. The court also observed that there are
other remedies to antitrust violations. Id. at 1178. One author agrees that the regulations
appear to be oriented toward antitrust, but that Customs really is following the statutory lan-
guage and not ruling on antitrust principles. See Atwood, supra note 57, at 309.
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section 526 and section 42 to independent United States trademark
registrants, Customs' regulations fail to protect the investment made
by a mark owner who maintains a business relationship with its for-
eign counterpart. The regulations' failure to incorporate this princi-
ple of territoriality could be of substantial consequence to American
consumers. 11
4
Although consumers pay less for grey market products, such ac-
tivity serves public interest for only a short time." 5 Continued paral-
lel importation eventually creates reduced marketing investments;
therefore, businesses will lose the incentive to invest time and money
in establishing or maintaining their own goodwill. " 6 As a result, con-
sumers will be confused and misled as to the source of the trade-
marked product.117 Consumer loyalty will decrease as the manufac-
turer loses incentive to maintain a high level of quality.
The antithesis of this view is found in Vivitar Corp. v. United
States."8 The Court of International Trade (CIT) rejected Vivitar's
claim that section 526 provides a trademark owner with the right to
exclude grey market imports. It concluded that section 526 contains
a special remedy to protect only American businesses that purchase
foreign trademarks from imports that violate their trademark
rights." 9 The CIT held that Customs' denial of protection to Vivitar
was justified because Vivitar had authorized the foreign application
of the mark. 20
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the CIT although
on a narrower basis. The Federal Circuit reasoned that Customs'
regulations have no effect on a trademark owner's right to obtain a
judicial remedy for trademark infringement and so were not invalid
for reducing the scope of a United States trademark owner's protec-
114. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, USITC Pub. 1616, Inv. No. 337-TA-165 (Nov.
1984), disapproved by the President, 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (Jan. 11, 1985) [hereinafter Batter-
ies]. For a comprehensive summary of the competing interests involved in the fight over the
legality of grey market imports, see Nat'l L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
115. Batteries, supra note 114, at 3-4.
116. Although certain post-importation remedies are available, the trademark owner
may not always be able to take advantage of the relief they provide. See supra note
33. Moreover, this relief usually is obtained only after a lengthy judicial or administrative
proceeding. Batteries, supra note 114, at 9.
117. Batteries, supra note 114, at 9.
118. 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). Vivitar Corp., owner of the Vivitar trademark in the
United States, licensed foreign manufacturers to apply its trademark to photographic equip-
ment. Vivitar's wholly-owned subsidiaries held licenses to market this equipment, but only
outside of the United States. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1556. Parties unrelated to Vivitar were
importing into the United States goods manufactured by Vivitar's foreign licensees and bear-
ing the Vivitar trademark without the written consent of Vivitar. Vivitar sought a declaratory
judgment from the Court of International Trade (CIT) that the United States Customs Ser-
vice must exclude these unauthorized imports. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1556.
119. Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 435.
120. Id. at 431.
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tion. 121 The court of appeals expressed a reluctance to change the
complete inclusion of grey market goods in the United States market
to total exclusion, asserting that, though Customs was probably
wrong, trademark owners should bring private court actions to en-
force their rights instead of attempting to compel Customs to enforce
them at the border. 122 The appellate court concluded by stating that
the determination of grey market violations of section 526 should be
decided on a case-by-case basis." 3
Both the Osawa and the Vivitar cases involved the rights of
United States trademark owners and their ability to police these
rights in the foreign importation of their trademarked goods. The
Vivitar case concentrated solely upon the interpretation of section
526, whereas Osawa was based primarily upon the court's perception
of trademark law. However, the basic issue in both cases was the
scope and meaning of the trademark right in international trade. 24
A trademark is intended to assure the public that the goods it
purchases are the goods associated with the affixed trademark,
thereby protecting the business goodwill of the United States trade-
mark owner. When Customs Service regulations permit the unautho-
rized importation of goods manufactured by authentic trademark
owners' foreign subsidiaries, section 526 of the Tariff Act, governing
importation of merchandise bearing American trademarks, has been
violated.
In Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks
(COPIAT) v. United States,"2 5 the plaintiff, a trade association of
companies owning American trademarks, challenged the validity of
the Customs regulations permitting grey market imports. The dis-
trict court held that the regulations were valid, stating that an ad-
ministrative agency's interpretation and application of a particular
statute is "presumed to be correct and consistent with Congressional
intent" when Congress, having knowledge of the agency's position,
"either amends the statute without affecting the administrative prac-
tice or refuses to act at all[.]' ' 26 The court of appeals reversed the
judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instruc-
tions to issue a declaratory judgment that the Customs regulations
are unlawfully contrary to Section 526 of the Tariff Act. 127 The
121. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569.
122. Id. at 1558.
123. Id. at 1570.
124. It has been urged that parallel importation is not a trademark problem at all. See
Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods Is Not a Trademark
Problem, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707, 714 (1959).
125. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
granted 55 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1986) (No. 86-625).
126. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 845, 852.
127. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918.
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appellate court determined that the regulations were inconsistent
with the plain meaning of section 526. 128 In contrast to Vivitar, the
COPIAT decision maintained that grey matter goods are excludable
both under section 526 of the Tariff Act without regard to trade-
mark infringement and under section 42 of the Lanham Act as in-
fringing merchandise. 129 On December 8, 1986, the United States
Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to resolve these conflicting appellate decisions and consoli-
dated the case with two others. 130 The issue to be decided will be
whether the standard for exclusion ought to be the objective one of
separate United States trademark ownership or the subjective one of
probable consumer deception and the consequent attenuation of the
United States-based goodwill as represented in the trademark.''
The interpretations of section 526 of the Tariff Act and section
42 of the Lanham Act have proven to be inconsistent and contradic-
tory, as shown by the case law. The plain language provides protec-
tion to United States trademark owners from unauthorized importa-
tion of goods bearing their mark.3 2 Since the 1950s, Customs'
interpretation has been driven in part by a perceived need to obviate
the antitrust problems raised by a multinational corporation's use of
an American subsidiary to preclude competition in the distribution
of the corporation's trademarked product.13 The regulations have
limited trademark protection to independent United States trade-
mark registrants. However, by denying protection to trademark own-
ers either related to their foreign counterparts or who have consented
to the foreign use of their mark, the regulations fail to recognize that
a separate and independent goodwill may have been established by
the domestic mark owner, rather than the foreign registrant. '1" The
statutory import restrictions on grey market goods are essential for
the preservation and recognition of trademark rights, regardless of
the relationship between the various owners of an international
mark.
128. Id. at 908.
129. Id. at 906.
130. United States v. COPIAT, 55 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1986) (No. 86-625).
The other cases are K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1986)
(No. 86-495) and 47th Street Photo v. COPIAT, 55 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1986) (No.
86-624). Both K Mart Corp. and 47th Street Photo were intervenors on the side of the federal
defendants in the district court and were appellees in the court of appeals in COPIAT's suit
against the Government.
131. Nat'l L.J., Mar. 9, 1987, at 21, col. I.
132. Krumholtz, supra note 3, at 111.
133. See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917,
134. Krumholtz, supra note 3, at 111.
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IV. Recent Legislation to Protect Parallel Importation
The "Price Competitive Products Act of 1986" "1 was the most
recent legislative attempt to provide trademark protection to United
States registrants. This Senate bill advocated the unencumbered con-
tinuation of parallel importation. The sponsors asserted that the new
law would protect the importation of "grey goods" by codifying Cus-
toms' existing regulations.136 The case-by-case approach taken by
the courts prompted Congress to attempt clarification of the existing
statutes and regulations.
On June 26, 1986 Senator John Chafee introduced the Price
Competitive Products Act of 1986 to add a new subsection to section
526 of the Tariff Act regarding codification of the Customs regula-
tions.1 37 Under the new Act, grey market goods could not be barred
from importation where related parties own the domestic and foreign
trademark rights. Supporting the grey market trade, Senator Chafee
proposed the bill to "maintain consumer access to grey market mer-
chandise."1 8 Senator Chafee explained that two routes exist by
which genuine trademarked goods are brought to American consum-
ers: (1) through an authorized American distributor owned or con-
trolled by a foreign manufacturer, or (2) through independent
American importers who purchase the goods from authorized
distributors.139
Treasury Department regulations have permitted independent
American importers to compete with foreign-owned importers. 14 0
These American independents are often small businesses that can
buy the genuine goods overseas on the open market at a lower price,
import these goods, and sell them to retailers for thirty to forty per-
cent less than the manufacturer's price. " This process had led to
135. S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 89 (1986).
136. Senate Finance Committee Holds Hearing on "Gray Goods" Bill, 32 PAT.. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. 296, 296 (1986) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on "Gray Goods'].
137. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 would have been amended by adding at the
end thereof the following:
(f)(1) Nothing in this section shall restrict the importation or sale of for-
eign-made articles bearing a trademark or trade name identical with one owned
and registered by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or association
created or organized within the United States when -
(A) both the foreign and the United States trademark or trade name
are owned by the same person or business entity;
(B) the foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are
parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common
ownership or control; or
(C) the articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark
or trade name applied under authorization of the United States owner.
S. 2614, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CoNG. REc. 89 (1986).
138. 132 CONG. REc. 89 (daily ed. June 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
139. Id.
140. Krumholtz, supra note 3, at Il1.
141. Id.
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enormous growth in discount stores and the smaller "mom and pop"
stores.142 Supporters of this bill argued that the elimination of the
parallel market will force American consumers to pay up to forty
percent more for products. 143
Senator Rudman, co-sponsor of S. 2614, explained that the ex-
isting Customs Service regulations permit parallel importation under
limited circumstances. These regulations are based on the sound pol-
icy of discouraging discriminatory pricing practices by foreign man-
ufacturers.144 Senator Rudman conceded that grey market importers
"free ride" on the trademark owners' marketing investments, but
added that parallel importation represents price competition for the
authorized dealer, which, in turn, narrows the price differential be-
tween the domestic and foreign markets so as to protect consumers
from high prices. 4 5
The Price Competitive Products Act's addition of subsection (f)
to section 526 would have codified the current customs regulations
and the fifty year old policy allowing parallel importation of genuine,
trademarked articles in cases where related parties own the trade-
marks here and abroad. In effect, the legislation attempted to protect
parallel importation and consumer savings. In opposition, COPIAT
emphasized that the central question in this controversy was not con-
sumer pricing but rather the preservation of trademark rights. The
Lanham Act protects trademark owners from misappropriation of
the energy, time, and money spent in presenting their products to the
public and ensures consumers that they are purchasing the genuine
trademarked good.' 4' Thus, the proposed bill promised to substan-
tially undermine the fundamental purposes of trademark protection,
according to COPIAT.
American trademark owners and prospective trademark regis-
trants support COPIAT's position. Preservation of the trademark
right is their primary concern. COPIAT contends that products
made abroad under trademark licenses are made to conform to the
standards of the foreign country. However, these standards may be
substantially different from the United States standards. 147 When
these products enter the American market and meet with the dissat-




144. According to Sen. Rudman, the bill would not authorize any importation not al-
ready permitted under the Customs regulations. See Senate Hearing on "Gray Goods", supra
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Senator Chafee represents the consumer viewpoint and contends
that parallel importation does not involve infringement of trademark
rights because the source of the goods is a legitimate licensee of the
trademark owner. It is his contention that the trademark rights do
not protect the advertising investment and that trademark owners
are seeking to enlist Customs to preserve their exclusive channels of
distribution. As to the damaged reputation of the trademark owner's
reputation, Senator Chafee replies that this argument infers that in-
ferior products are licensed for foreign consumption and superior
products are licensed for domestic consumption. Senator Chafee con-
cludes that, if trademark owners want to protect their reputation,
they should label their products to disclose these differences. "
There has been strong opposition to the codification of the Cus-
toms regulations struck down in COPIAT as an inconsistent inter-
pretation of section 526. On the other hand, consumer-conscious
Americans most likely would support legislation that promotes price
competition between manufacturers and trademark owners. The op-
position eventually prevailed in defeating the bill, which never made
it out of the Senate's International Trade Subcommittee. 149
V. Proposed Solutions to the Grey Market Problem
The interpretation of section 526 of the Tariff Act and section
42 of the Lanham Act has been limited by the application of Cus-
toms' regulations. Congress took an affirmative step to remedy the
confusion in the trademark laws with the introduction of the propo-
sal to codify the Customs regulations so as to permanently deny pro-
tection to trademark owners, licensees, or distributors under common
ownership. One remedy, set forth in section 526(c) of the Tariff Act
and favored by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Vivitar as a
compromise solution, restricts the trademark owner to a private ac-
tion against the importer. 5 ' This remedy is inadequate for two rea-
sons. First, the identities of importers are often difficult to ascer-
tain.15' Second, even if the importers are identified, the remedy
requires United States trademark owners to bring an endless series
148. Id.
149. 99th Cong.-Senate, 1 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,052 (Dec. 10, 1986).
150. See ivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982) provides:
Any person dealing in any such merchandise may be enjoined from dealing
therein within the United States or may be required to export or destroy such
merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark and shall be liable for
the same damages and profits provided for wrongful use of a trademark...
15 1. See Greying American Trademarks, supra note 11, at I10. The closely guarded
secrecy of the identities of grey market importers was exemplified in Osawa & Co. v. B&H
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the defendants chose sanctions under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 37 (concerning failure to cooperate in discovery) rather than
identify the sources of their grey market products. Id. at 1166 n.2, 1170.
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of lawsuits. 151 Once a judicial determination is made, only the goods
of a particular named defendant are prevented from being im-
ported.153 This importer can merely divert the goods until the United
States trademark owner identifies the new source and obtain's an ex-
clusion order in a second lawsuit.154 This process fails to adequately
protect the rights afforded in section 526. 151
The rights of the United States trademark owner must be deter-
mined in order to quell the controversy surrounding grey market im-
ports.156 The existence of the independent United States goodwill of
a trademark is evidence of ownership by an exclusive United States
distributor. If the party asserting a legal trademark right is not, in
fact, the owner of the United States trademark, the case will often
be dismissed. 157 However, where the registered owner owns the
trademark rights, he has a right to trademark protection of his
investments.
The proposal 5 8 of requiring the related distributor of foreign-
made goods to distinguish the goods sold in the United States from
the goods sold abroad would place a financial burden on the distribu-
tor. However, since it was the exclusive United States distributor of
the goods who created the distinct American goodwill for those
goods, the distributor should be charged with distinguishing the
trademarks to prevent damage to its goodwill. The labeling of goods
would allow one to differentiate between the qualities of goods sold
in the United States from those goods sold abroad.159 This policy
balances the basic trademark functions in the international market
with the need for the United States to define and enforce its own
concept of trademark law and its desire to discourage anticompeti-
152. See Greying American Trademarks, supra note II, at 110.
153. Id. at 111.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. The American distributor's enforcement of trademark rights continues to be justi-
fied only when the distributor maintains independent control over the use of transferred trade-
marks. Preventing Importation, supra note 2, at 337.
157. Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States and Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo: The Issue
of Common Control in the Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods, 17 INT'L L.J. GEO.
U. L. CEN. 177, 203 n. 167 (1985).
158. The Working Group on Intellectual Property, comprised of officials from the Office
of Management and Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Treasury Department, the
Commerce Department, the State Department, the Justice Department, and the U.S. Trade
Representative, is considering options from which it will choose one as a recommended solution
and forward the recommendation to the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade. Inside U.S.
Trade, April 26, 1985, at 817, col. 1. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
159. Greying American Trademarks, supra note 11, at 112-13. One option would be to
require labeling the grey market goods to inform consumers that the goods they purchase are
"neither authorized nor warranted by the U.S. trademark holder." Id. Although this require-
ment may alert consumers to the grey market problem and thus decrease consumer confusion,
it nevertheless may cause degradation of the trademark's goodwill in the American markets if
the product proves to be defective. It also would not absolve the problem of free riding on
United States marketing investments. Id.
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tive practices in the United States marketplace.
Another proposal would allow related companies to exclude im-
ports after a Customs determination that the imports were not iden-
tical to the authorized goods. 160 This option would place a tremen-
dous enforcement burden on Customs and the judiciary. 161
However, this "identity" proposal forces the United States trade-
mark owner to prove the import's "nonidentity" and also encourages
free-riding.16 2
A third option would allow importation only if the mark was
removed or obliterated.' The United States trademark owner's
goodwill and reputation would be protected under this option, but
this process would destroy the grey market. 64 Once the trademark
identification is removed from the unauthorized import, the con-
sumer of expensive, higher quality goods would be less likely to
purchase generic goods sufficient to keep the grey market importer in
competition. 165
A final option is the creation of a new administrative policy
prohibiting grey market goods bearing registered United States
trademarks unless written consent is provided by the United States
trademark owner.' 66 This is the position most commonly advocated
by United States trademark owners.' This proposal reflects the
plain meaning of section 526 by protecting all United States trade-
mark owners, regardless of their foreign affiliation. 168 The exclusiv-
ity of grey market goods is consistent with antitrust law because
American companies with foreign affiliation are given the power to
exercise the same control over their products that domestic manufac-
turers enjoy. 169 This proposal acknowledges the United States trade-
mark owner's effort to meet consumer demands. Through increased
marketing investments, the trademark owner eliminates consumer
confusion. Furthermore, this option provides incentive to preserve the
trademark owner's goodwill and recognizes his right to protection of
160. Id. at 114. Under this option, "identity" would be determined based on shape,
taste, color, freshness, composition, trade dress, function, durability, similarity of warranty,
and availability of repair services. Id.
161. As section 526 is presently interpreted, it is completely futile, if not an impossible
task, for Customs to make determinations of international business relationships. Atwood,
supra note 57, at 311.
162. See Greying American Trademarks, supra note 11, at 114. Cf. Osawa & Co. v.
B&H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (equity indicates that the burdens of
informing the consumer that a product has not been authorized for sale and is not warranted
by the United States trademark owner should be on the grey market importer).
163. See Greying American Trademarks, supra note I1, at 114.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 115.
167. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
168. See Greying American Trademarks, supra note 11, at 115.
169. Id.
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his time, money, and energy spent.
VI. Conclusion
The importation of foreign-made trademarked goods creates the
need for a system to preserve both the meaning and integrity of
United States trademark law. The plain language of both section
526 of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham Act provides
protection to United States trademark owners from the unauthorized
importation of goods bearing their mark. The Customs Service has
narrowed the protection afforded to United States registrants inde-
pendent from the foreign owner of the mark. By qualifying the scope
of protection afforded by section 526 and section 42, Customs has
made it easier for grey market importers to infringe on United
States trademark owners' rights. Furthermore, Customs should not
be permitted to apply a blanket rule in implementing its own notion
of antitrust policy since it is the duty of Congress to afford greater
protections to trademark owners by preventing infringements.
By denying protection to trademark owners that are related to
their foreign counterparts, the Customs regulations fail to recognize
an independent goodwill that may have been established by the do-
mestic trademark owner in the United States, regardless of any affil-
iation with the foreign registrant. In rejecting this possibility, the
existing Customs regulations represent an outdated concept of trade-
mark recognition, protection, and trade. However, these were the
regulations that the Senate proposed to codify in the Price Competi-
tive Products Act of 1986.
The plain language of section 526 and section 42 provides for
import restrictions on grey market goods. Import restrictions are a
necessary and proper mechanism of trademark protection regardless
of the relationship between the various owners of an international
mark. Customs' emphasis on this relationship narrows the broad pro-
tections offered to trademark owners. Codification of these regula-
tions would substantially undermine these protections offered against
the misappropriation of the trademark owner's time, money, and en-
ergy spent in presenting their products to the public. Inevitably,
businesses will no longer have the incentive to invest in the establish-
ment of a mark for their goods, and consumers will be left without a
principal means of distinguishing between products and rewarding
quality with continued purchases.
Pierrette Alyssa Newman
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